

## Observations and Recommendations on the International Criminal Court and the African Union in advance of the 17<sup>th</sup> African Union Summit (30 June-1 July)

### I. Introduction

On the occasion of the 17<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union (AU)—which will take place in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, from 30 June to 1 July—we, the undersigned African civil society organisations and international organisations with a presence in Africa, write to share our views and make recommendations with regard to matters concerning the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the AU. The document covers seven areas of action, which we believe are critical for African ICC states parties to undertake. As discussed in detail below, we call on African ICC states parties to:

- Take clear positions in support of the ICC at African Union summits;
- Press for justice for serious crimes in violation of international law in Darfur and Kenya;
- Direct concerns regarding AU deferral requests of ICC situations to the Security Council;
- Address concerns regarding expansion of the African Court to prosecute serious crimes in violation of international law;
- Ensure cooperation with the ICC's prosecution of serious crimes committed in Libya;
- Uphold ICC state party obligations vis-à-vis visits by persons subject to ICC arrest warrants; and
- Ensure the selection of the most qualified candidate as the next ICC prosecutor through a fair and merit-based process.

### II. Take clear positions in support of the ICC at African Union summits

Africa has been at the forefront of the fight against impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. African states played a critical role in the negotiations that led to the formation of the ICC, and over 30 African states have ratified the Rome Statute, which establishes the ICC.

Following arrest warrants issued by the ICC for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur, the ICC's relationship with the AU has been strained. The AU has expressed its deep concern over the arrest warrants, and undertaken initiatives that undermine the court, including calling for non-cooperation by AU member states in the arrest of President al-Bashir.<sup>1</sup> AU officials have also suggested that the ICC is targeting Africans.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> See Assembly of the AU, Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV), Kampala, 27 July 2010, paras. 5, 8, and 9.

<sup>2</sup> See "ICC accused of 'exclusively' targeting Africans," *Mail & Guardian Online*, 20 April 2011, <http://mg.co.za/article/2011-04-20-icc-accused-of-exclusively-targeting-africans> (accessed 3 June 2010). ("We've been complaining...about the double standard,' AU commission president Jean Ping said, referring to the court in The Hague...'[P]eople who are targeted there, all of them, are exclusively Africans.'")

It is a fact that all situations under ICC investigation to date are in Africa, which has been a source of disquiet among some observers. Furthermore, international justice has yet to be applied evenly around the globe; individuals from powerful states and their allies have been able to evade accountability for serious crimes in violation of international law, for example, in Burma, Chechnya, and Gaza/Israel.

However, the number of African cases is also a manifestation of African commitment to justice for the most serious crimes. A majority of the ICC's situations came about as a result of voluntary referrals by the governments of states where the crimes were committed.<sup>3</sup> We believe Africa should build on support for accountability as opposed to scaling down its resolve because others have failed to demonstrate their commitment or temporarily managed to avoid judicial scrutiny. The AU should indeed work proactively to achieve wider access to justice for the worst crimes, rather than seeking to limit the ICC's ability to function effectively.

Support and cooperation by ICC states parties for the ICC is vital. Without its own enforcement mechanism, the court depends heavily on state cooperation to operate. Accordingly, we call upon African ICC states parties to:

- Express support for the ICC and cooperation with the ICC at AU summits;
- Work to avoid further calls by the AU for member states not to cooperate with the ICC or otherwise undermine the ICC's ability to advance its mission and mandate;
- Express individual government positions in support of the ICC where AU action might suggest lack of support;<sup>4</sup> and
- Press for the establishment of an ICC liaison office at AU headquarters and conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the AU and the ICC.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> These are Democratic Republic of Congo, northern Uganda, and Central African Republic. Two other situations were referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council (Darfur and Libya). The prosecutor acted on his own initiative to open an investigation in only one situation (Kenya).

<sup>4</sup> States such as Botswana, South Africa, and Uganda have reaffirmed their commitment to abide by their obligations to arrest ICC suspects in the wake of AU summit decisions calling for non-cooperation. See, for example, "Botswana stands by the International Criminal Court," Botswana Press Agency, 28 July 2010, <http://www.gov.bw/en/News/Botswana-stands-by-the-International-Criminal-Court/> (accessed 22 September 2010); Godfrey Olukya, "Uganda willing to arrest Sudan President al-Bashir for war crimes," Associated Press, 14 July 2009, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/international/africa/2009/07/14/216163/Uganda-willing.htm> (accessed 14 June 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Despite African ICC state party support for an ICC liaison office at AU headquarters, the office was rejected for the time being by the AU heads of state in 2010. Assembly of the AU, Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV), Kampala, 27 July 2010, para. 8. We continue to believe a liaison office could play an important role in promoting effective communication and exchange between the AU and the ICC, including by helping to clarify misconceptions. In addition, a memorandum of understanding would allow the ICC and the AU to address matters of mutual importance. Similar agreements exist between the ICC and the European Union, the Organisation of American States, and the United Nations.

### III. Press for accountability for crimes committed in Kenya and Darfur and direct any concerns regarding requests for deferral of ICC situations to the UN Security Council

At the January 2011 summit, the AU adopted a decision to endorse Kenya's request for a deferral pursuant to article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC's cases involving Kenya.<sup>6</sup> Following this endorsement, the government of Kenya submitted a formal request to the United Nations (UN) Security Council for the two cases to be deferred. The Security Council held two meetings to consider this request in 2011, but did not grant it.

The undersigned organizations believe that a deferral of the ICC's investigations and prosecutions in Kenya is unwarranted. For a deferral to be granted, the Security Council must find a threat to international peace and security pursuant to article 16 of the Rome Statute. This is a high threshold and suggests that deferrals should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Notably, one of the main justifications for the AU's support of Kenya's bid for a deferral was to allow for national prosecutions. However, national accountability efforts are not a legal basis for deferrals, consistent with articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute.

In supporting a deferral of the ICC's Kenya cases, we believe the AU has given inadequate attention to the will of the citizens of its states and the victims of atrocities who wish to see justice done. For example, opinion polls in Kenya have indicated that the majority of Kenyans support the ICC process, and that the ICC is the only process that could bring justice and address the festering culture of impunity.<sup>7</sup>

The situation in Darfur is distinct. While the Security Council has discussed the AU's deferral request on Darfur,<sup>8</sup> the council's consideration of the request was less direct than for Kenya.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, the victims of atrocities in Darfur similarly yearn for justice. The AU's own panel on Darfur found that in Darfur and Sudan, "many are strongly opposed to any suspension of the ICC action, seeing it as

---

<sup>6</sup> The ICC has issued summonses for six individuals in two separate cases. These individuals include senior politicians and government officials affiliated with both sides of Kenya's 2007-08 post-election violence.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Walter Menya, "Poll: 61pc of Kenyans prefer ICC trials," *Daily Nation*, 5 April 2011, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1139102/-/7qbmkg/-/index.html> (accessed 6 June 2011).

<sup>8</sup> At a Security Council meeting in 2008 on the AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur, the ICC's Darfur prosecutions and the lack of sufficient support to secure deferral of the cases were discussed. For example, the Russian government stated that deferral was not possible because of "resistance by a number of Security Council members." The Libyan government similarly noted: "Despite all the reasons that we put forward to justify [deferral of the Sudanese situation], we did not receive the hoped-for response from certain Council members." UN Security Council, 5947th Meeting, S/PV.5947, 31 July 2008. See also UN Security Council, Resolution 1828, S/RES/1828 (2008), preamble.

<sup>9</sup> Discussions on the Kenyan deferral request resulted in a press statement by the Security Council. See SC President Néstor Osorio, "Press Statement on the request of Kenya for deferral under article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (S/2011/201)," *United Nations Webcast*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/04/sc-president-nestor-osorio-colombia-on-dr-congo-security-council-media-stakeout-2.html> (accessed 6 June 2011).

an escape route... from the demands of justice,” and “welcomed... ICC prosecutions as the only appropriate mechanism for dealing with the situation they have suffered in Darfur.”<sup>10</sup>

Accordingly, we urge African ICC states parties to urge the AU to:

- Take concrete steps to encourage the governments of Kenya and Sudan, consistent with the AU’s rejection of impunity in Article 4 of its Constitutive Act, to ensure accountability for serious crimes that have been committed in both states; and
- Direct any outstanding concerns regarding deferrals of cases in the Kenya and Darfur situations to the UN Security Council (as opposed to the ICC, or the threat of non-cooperation with the court). The ICC has no authority to grant or reject deferral requests. This is a power left exclusively to the Security Council under article 16 of the Rome Statute.

#### **IV. Concerns regarding expansion of the African Court’s jurisdiction**

The AU has indicated its intention to expand the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Court) to include prosecutions of individuals for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Increased avenues for accountability are positive in principle. However, the undersigned organisations have concerns with the proposed expansion given the range of challenges the African Court already faces and the additional challenges that expansion of its jurisdiction will pose.

In 2008, the AU issued a protocol merging two courts on the continent, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice, establishing the African Court. The new court—whose protocol will enter into force once 15 states ratify it—comprises two chambers, one for general legal matters and one for rulings on human rights treaties. Notably, states will be required to submit declarations to enable individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGO) to submit claims directly to the African Court; only five states have made these necessary declarations for such submissions to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The African Court is limited to cases that relate to the responsibility of states vis-à-vis human rights violations and to the interpretation of treaties. Expanding the court’s jurisdiction to prosecutions of individuals for serious crimes would thus put enormous challenges on the court to address a large, distinct area. For example, prosecutions of individuals require criminal investigations, which often span many different locations and relate to multiple actors and incidents. They also require expertise in examining witnesses and victims with due regard to their protection, while ensuring the rights of the accused.

---

<sup>10</sup> AU Peace and Security Council, “Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD),” Abuja, 29 October 2009, paras. 240 and 243.

Against this backdrop, we encourage African ICC states parties to insist on:

- Wider consultation with civil society—including victim groups and bar associations—and officials of the existing African Court and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights regarding expansion of the African Court’s jurisdiction;
- Adherence by the African Court to international standards and best practice regarding any prosecutions of serious crimes in violation of international law, including, but not limited to, judicial and prosecutorial independence, rights of the accused, and witness and victim protection;
- The matching of the political commitment to expand the African Court’s jurisdiction and resources to enable operations in accordance with international standards and best practices; and
- Clarity regarding the relationship between an expanded African Court and the ICC, and recognizing the ICC’s ultimate role in determining which cases come under its authority, ensuring that expansion of the African Court does not undermine the ICC’s role as a crucial court of last resort where accountability for serious crimes is not otherwise possible, consistent with the AU’s rejection of impunity in Article 4 of its Constitutive Act.

## **V. Ensure cooperation with the ICC’s prosecution of serious crimes committed in Libya**

On 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1970 referring the situation in Libya to the ICC. The unanimous vote for the referral, which was supported by the three African members of the Security Council—Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa—followed sustained reports of grave human rights violations committed by the Libyan government. The Security Council was also mindful of widespread condemnation by the AU and others of violations committed in Libya.

The timing of the Security Council referral makes this the earliest the ICC has become involved in a situation. On 16 May 2011, the prosecutor disclosed that he was seeking arrest warrants for widespread and systematic attacks on civilians in Libya, namely for Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam, and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Sanussi.

Meanwhile, on 17 March 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing all means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect civilians in Libya. Although supported by the African members of the Security Council, the resolution was of immediate concern to the AU, which opposes any form of foreign military intervention in Libya.<sup>11</sup>

The AU subsequently issued a decision on 25 May, which we believe creates a risk that Resolutions 1970 (ICC referral) and 1973 (the authorization of the use of force) are being conflated.<sup>12</sup> Specifically,

---

<sup>11</sup> Five members of the Security Council—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany—also abstained from Resolution 1973 for reasons including a rejection of the use of force and a concern for the impact on Libyans.

<sup>12</sup> Assembly of the AU, Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec/(01.2011), Addis Ababa, 25 May 2011, paras. 3 and 7.

the decision states: “[T]he Assembly... expressed deep concern at the dangerous precedence being set by one-sided interpretations of these resolutions [1970 and 1973], in an attempt to provide a legal authority for military and other actions on the ground that are clearly outside the scope of these resolutions....”

The ICC’s investigation and prosecution of crimes in Libya is distinct from the authorization of the use of force. While the interpretation and implementation of Resolution 1973 may pose concerns, the ICC’s work is a separate matter of accountability. Moreover, cooperation of ICC states parties is likely to be critical to the ICC’s investigation and prosecution of crimes committed in Libya: the court is investigating crimes committed in a country where the government is overtly hostile to proceedings and the enforcement of any future arrest warrants will be a major challenge.

Accordingly, we urge African ICC states parties to:

- Ensure that concerns regarding the Security Council’s authorization of force in Libya do not detract from the ICC’s independent, judicial role in ensuring accountability for crimes committed in Libya; and
- Ensure cooperation with the ICC in relation to its Libya investigations and prosecutions.

## **VI. Uphold obligations as ICC states parties vis-à-vis visits by persons subject to ICC arrest warrants**

Following the AU decision calling for non-cooperation by AU member states with the ICC in the arrest of President al-Bashir, some officials have argued that the AU call for non-cooperation takes precedence over ICC treaty obligations.<sup>13</sup> Such claims, however, do not take into account that the ICC’s Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty, which contains binding international obligations. Such obligations are not negated by AU decisions, irrespective of conflicts that may arise between states’ commitments as AU and ICC members.

In ratifying the Rome Statute, African ICC states parties assumed obligations that require them to cooperate with the court, including arrest and surrender of suspects. Accordingly, while states can be expected to face pressure to allow President al-Bashir on their territory without arrest, ICC states parties are well-placed to take the position that:

- A visit by President al-Bashir creates the prospect of a breach by ICC states parties of their obligations as parties to the court; and

---

<sup>13</sup> See “Chad says it will not execute ICC warrant against Libya’s Gaddafi,” *Sudan Tribune*, 18 May 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Chad-says-it-will-not-execute-ICC,38950>; “Zambia says Sudanese president should not fear arrest on its territory,” *Sudan Tribune*, 11 December 2010, [http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=37241](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=37241); “Kenya pushes back over war crimes suspect’s visit,” *CNN*, 2 September 2010, [http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-02/world/kenya.bashir.visit\\_1\\_al-bashir-president-bashir-alfred-mutua?\\_s=PM:WORLD](http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-02/world/kenya.bashir.visit_1_al-bashir-president-bashir-alfred-mutua?_s=PM:WORLD) (accessed 7 June 2011).

- Given their obligations under the Rome Statute, states parties should arrest President al-Bashir if he enters their territory, but at a minimum they should prevent visits by him.

This is consistent with an AU decision, which calls for states to balance ICC and AU obligations.<sup>14</sup>

## **VII. Support the fair selection of the most qualified candidate as the next ICC prosecutor**

In December 2011 the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) of the ICC will elect its second prosecutor. The election of a new prosecutor will have a major impact on the court's work, credibility, and legitimacy over the next decade.

We understand that the selection of the next ICC prosecutor may be considered during the AU summit. To ensure that the most highly qualified candidate is elected, it is essential that the search for the next ICC prosecutor be driven by merit. In this regard, we believe key qualifications include demonstrated experience in: prosecuting complex criminal cases, acting independently and impartially, managing institutions with professional excellence, and communicating effectively to a wide variety of constituencies.

The ASP Bureau's December 2010 decision to establish a search committee to seek out possible candidates and carefully review expressions of interest with a view to recommending at least three prosecutor candidates is therefore a welcome development. Accordingly, we urge African ICC states parties to:

- Forward to the search committee the names of as many of the most qualified candidates to ensure the search committee has the best possible pool of candidates from which to draw;<sup>15</sup> and
- Avoid politicization of the elections process, which risks obscuring the merits of applications.

### **Organisations signing on to this document are:**

1. Access to Justice, Lagos, Nigeria
2. Action Against Impunity for Human Rights (ACIDH), Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
3. Action Against Violations of the Rights of Vulnerable People (ACVDP), Kinshasa, DRC
4. Action of Christian Activists for Human Rights in Shabunda (ACADHOSHA), Bukavu, DRC
5. Actions for Genuine Democratic Alternatives (AGENDA), Monrovia, Liberia

<sup>14</sup> Assembly/AU/Dec.296 (XV), Kampala, 27 July 2010, para. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Names of candidates may be provided to the ASP Search Committee through the ASP Secretariat, at the following email address: [rene.holbach@icc-cpi.int](mailto:rene.holbach@icc-cpi.int). See "Search Committee for the position of ICC Prosecutor takes up work," ICC press release, 2 February 2011, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/09944531-548B-467F-882D-06EF5937899B.htm> (accessed 9 June 2011).

6. Africa in Democracy and Good Governance (ADG), Serekunda, Gambia
7. Africa Legal Aid, Accra, Ghana
8. Africa Youth Coalition Against Hunger Sierra Leone, Freetown, Sierra Leone
9. African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO), Conakry, Guinea
10. African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO), Dakar, Senegal
11. African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, Kampala, Uganda
12. African Development and Peace Initiative (ADPI), Adjumani, Uganda
13. African Federation Association, Kampala, Uganda
14. African Youth Initiative Network (AYINET) – Uganda Chapter, Lira, Uganda
15. Alliances for Africa (AfA), Lagos, Nigeria
16. Amuira District Development Agency, Amuira, Uganda
17. Association for the Defense of Human Rights (“Droit au Droit”), Douala, Cameroon
18. Association of Human and Prisoner Rights (ADHUC), Brazzaville, Republic of Congo
19. Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH), Burundi
20. Association for Reconciliation and Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts (ARREPAC), Burundi
21. Benin Coalition for the ICC, Cotonou, Benin
22. Burkinabé Coalition for the ICC, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
23. Burundi Coalition for Development and Social Rehabilitation (CODR UBUNTU), Bujumbura, Burundi
24. Burundi Coalition for the ICC, Bujumbura, Burundi
25. Cameroon Coalition for the ICC, Douala, Cameroon
26. Campaign for Human Rights, Kinshasa, DRC
27. Caritas Counseling Centre, Gulu, Uganda
28. Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL-SL), Freetown, Sierra Leone
29. Centre for Civil Rights and Practice, Freetown, Sierra Leone
30. Centre for Media Studies and Peace Building (CEMESP-Liberia), Monrovia, Liberia
31. Centre for Human Rights and Peace Education (CHRPE), Bo, Sierra Leone
32. Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), Lilongwe, Malawi
33. Central African Republic Coalition for the ICC, CAR
34. Children Education Society (CHESO), Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
35. Christian Actions for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT), Burundi
36. Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre (CIRDDOC), Enugu, Nigeria
37. Club of Friends of Congolese Law, Kinshasa, DRC
38. Coalition for the ICC (Global), Cotonou, Benin
39. Coalition of Eastern NGOs, Enugu, Nigeria
40. Coalition for Justice and Accountability (COJA), Freetown, Sierra Leone
41. Collective of NGOs for the Promotion of Justice (COPJ), Kinshasa, DRC
42. Community Policing Partners, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria
43. Congolese Coalition for Transitional Justice, Bukavu, DRC
44. Congolese Foundation for the Promotion of Peace and Human Rights (FOCDP), Kisangani, DRC



45. Congolese Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH), Brazzaville, Republic of Congo
46. Congolese Synergy for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (SYCOPRODH), Kisangani, DRC
47. Counselling Services Unit, Harare, Zimbabwe
48. Deaf Rights Network (DERINE), Kampala, Uganda
49. Discussion and Action for the Awakening of Consciences and the Evolution of Mentalities, Burundi
50. DRC National Coalition for the ICC (CN-CPI), Kinshasa, DRC
51. East African School of Human Rights, Nairobi, Kenya
52. Fore-Runners of Children's Universal Rights for Survival (FOCUS), Monrovia, Liberia
53. Forum for the Rights of Women (FOROW), Monrovia, Liberia
54. Forum for Strengthening Civil Society (FORSC), Burundi
55. Foundation for the Environment, Human Rights, and Good Leadership, Abia, Nigeria
56. Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI), Kampala, Uganda
57. Gideon Foundation against Child Sacrifice, Soroti, Uganda
58. Global Alliance for Peace and Sustainability, Monrovia, Liberia
59. Halley Movement, Curepipe, Mauritius
60. Human Rights and Advocacy Network for Democracy (HAND), Kampala, Uganda
61. Human Rights Defenders Solidarity Network, Kampala, Uganda
62. Human Rights First Rwanda Association, Kigali, Rwanda
63. The Human Rights Law Service (HURILAWS), Lagos, Nigeria
64. Human Rights Network for Journalists – Uganda (HRNJ), Kampala, Uganda
65. Human Rights Network – Uganda (HURINET-U), Kampala, Uganda
66. Human Rights Watch, Johannesburg, South Africa
67. International Centre for Policy and Conflict (ICPC), Nairobi, Kenya
68. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Africa Regional Programme, Johannesburg, South Africa
69. International Crime in Africa Programme (ICAP), Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa
70. International Federation for Human Rights-Nairobi (FIDH), Nairobi, Kenya
71. International Society for Civil Liberties and the Rule of Law, Onitsha, Nigeria
72. Ivoirian Coalition for the ICC, Abidjan, Ivory Coast
73. Ivorian League for Human Rights, Abidjan, Ivory Coast
74. Ivorian Movement for Human Rights, Abidjan, Ivory Coast
75. Journalists for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, Kinshasa, DRC
76. Kazoo Development Association, Kiruhura, Uganda
77. Kenya Human Rights Commission, Nairobi, Kenya
78. Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ-Kenya), Nairobi, Kenya
79. Kikandwa Rural Communities Development Organization (KIRUCODO), Mukono, Uganda
80. Kituo cha Sheria – The Centre for Legal Empowerment, Nairobi, Kenya
81. Kumi Human Rights Initiative, Kumi, Uganda

82. Lawyers for Human Rights, Pretoria, South Africa
83. LEAD-Centrafrique for Sustainable Development, CAR
84. League for the Promotion and Integral Development of the Woman and Child (LIPRODIFE), Kisangani, DRC
85. Liberia Democratic Institute (LDI), Monrovia, Liberia
86. Liberian Coalition for the ICC, Monrovia, Liberia
87. Lira NGO Forum, Lira, Uganda
88. Mafindor Youth Development Association and Advocacy Network, Kono, Sierra Leone
89. Mauritanian Association for Human Rights (AMDH), Mauritania
90. Moroccan Organization for Human Rights (OMDH), Rabat, Morocco
91. Movement for Individual Liberties (MOLI), Bujumbura, Burundi
92. Movement for Youth and Gender Empowerment, Lagos, Nigeria
93. National Coalition on Affirmative Action (NCAA), Abuja, Nigeria
94. National Human Rights Organization (ONDH), Dakar, Senegal
95. National Youth Advocacy Network, Bo, Sierra Leone
96. Network of Local Initiatives for Sustainable Development (REID), North Kivu, DRC
97. Network Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (NMDHR), Freetown, Sierra Leone
98. Nigeria Coalition for the ICC (NCICC), Abuja, Nigeria
99. Organisation Against Poverty (OCP), Niamey, Niger
100. Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN), Mogadishu, Somalia
101. PEN Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya
102. People for Peace and Defense of Rights (PPDR), Kampala, Uganda
103. Prison Watch Sierra Leone, Freetown, Sierra Leone
104. Promotion of Democracy and Protection of Human Rights, Goma, DRC
105. Regional Associates for Community Initiatives (RACI), Kampala, Uganda
106. Research Centre on Environment, Democracy, and Human Rights (CREDDHO), Goma, DRC
107. Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LIPRODHOR), Kigali, Rwanda
108. Sierra Leone Coalition for the ICC (SLICC), Freetown, Sierra Leone
109. Society Against Poverty and Hunger, Lagos, Nigeria
110. Society for Democratic Initiative (SDI), Freetown, Sierra Leone
111. Soroti Development Association and NGOs Network (SODANN), Soroti, Uganda
112. Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Johannesburg, South Africa
113. SPEAK Human Rights and Environmental Initiative, Port Louis, Mauritius
114. Stakeholder Democracy Network, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
115. Sudan Democracy First Group (SDFG), Juba, Sudan
116. Synergy of Women for the Victims of Sexual Violence (SFVS), North Kivu, Goma, DRC
117. Transition Monitoring Group, Abuja, Nigeria
118. Uganda Coalition for the ICC (UCICC), Kampala, Uganda
119. Uganda Victims Foundation, Lira, Uganda
120. West African Bar Association (WABA), Abuja, Nigeria

121. West African Human Rights Defenders Network, Lamé, Togo
122. West African Network for Peace, Sierra Leone
123. Women's Forum, Freetown, Sierra Leone
124. Working for Forensic and Stabilization Group (WFSG), Bujumbura, Burundi
125. World Liberation Ministries International, Monrovia, Liberia